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Abstract
Increasing attention is being paid to the Paris Climate Agreement and the impacts ofNationally
DeterminedContributions (NDCs) intended to limit global warming to 1.5 °C.However, the nature
and evolution of existing policymixes that underlie NDCs remain poorly understood. This critical
issue has emerged from the outcomes of the TalanoaDialogue for Climate Ambition, where little
progress wasmade in building a comprehensive, evidence-based foundation for effective climate
policy. To a large extent, this is due to the nature of the process, and a lack of data related to policy
interventions in the pre-2020 period, notably their composition, coverage, and orientation.We seek
to address these shortcomings by applying a directed content analysis to a dataset of national and city-
level policy interventions. The aim is to quantify the nature and evolution of policy efforts that
promote the adoption of low-carbon energy technologies (LCETs) globally. Fifteen databases,
containingmore than 10,000 policies andmeasures were reviewed. Ourfindings highlight the rapid
spread of policy portfolios and an international convergence towards economic incentives (notably
subsidies). At the city level, technology and infrastructure policies dominate. However, it is unclear to
what extent behavioural factors (i.e., cognitive,motivational and contextual aspects) that affect the
choice and use of LCETs are taken into account in policy design. This is particularly important because
studies thatmodel the feasibility of the 1.5 °C target reveal behavioural changes and the rapid adoption
of low-carbon lifestyles as critical enabling factors. In response to the outcomes from theTalanoa
Dialogue, we argue that policymakers need to go beyond stringent policymixes and rapidly re-think
their traditional economic-driven policymaking approach. Farmore attention needs to be given to
behavioural factors when designing, evaluating and implementing LCETpolicies.
1. Introduction
NationallyDeterminedContributions (NDCs) are at the heart of the Paris Climate Agreement, and their analysis
has attracted growing attention from scholars, policymakers and practitioners [1–5]. The 2018
Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC) Special Report onGlobalWarming of 1.5 °C found a
significant gap between the emission reductions thatNDCs can potentially deliver and those that are needed to
limit global warming to 1.5 °C [6]. Typically, the gap is said to be due to insufficiently rigorous near- and long-
termmitigation policies [1, 7, 8]. Despite increasing attention to theNDCs, the Paris Agreement (1/CP.21/II-
17) emphasises the point, stating that ‘much greater emission reduction efforts will be required than those
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average temperature to below 2 °Cabove pre-industrial levels’ [9]. Therefore,much greater consideration needs
to be given to developing policy portfolios that limit climate change, beyondNDCs.
In this context, the 2018 FacilitativeDialogue (known as the ‘TalanoaDialogue for Climate Ambition’)was
launched at the 23rdConference of the Parties (COP23) to theUnitedNations FrameworkConvention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC).Work started in January 2018 to support the long-termpolicy efforts related to the
Paris Agreement. Themandate was to take stock of global policy efforts, particularly in the run up to 2020,
designed to achieve the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement (stated inArticle 4, paragraph 1) and to inform the
development ofNDCs in accordancewith Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Agreement6. In principle, the Talanoa
Dialoguemarked the beginning of the process of strengtheningNDCs, and the key questions guiding the
initiative were: ‘where arewe?’, ‘where dowewant to go?’ and ‘howdowe get there?’ [10]. Both the preparatory
and political phases have now concluded, and a report was published inNovember 20187.
When scrutinising the results of the TalanoaDialogue, the understanding of pre-2020 policy interventions
(‘where arewe?’) appears limited and inadequate. First, reporting and data availability weremajor challenges.
UnlikeNDCs, which can be easily accessed via theUNFCCC registry [11], data of pre-2020 policy interventions
are dispersed overmultiple sources. Second, input from the Parties wasmarginal. Of the 473 inputs received by
October 2018, only 44 (9%) came directly from them (see 12). Of these, 37 (7%) specifically addressed the
question ‘where are we?’, and the answers covered awide range of issues (e.g. emission trends, climate impacts,
vulnerability, and institutional arrangements). In fact, policy issues weremostly addressed by non-Party
stakeholders. The third issue is that the effectiveness of policy interventions and their evolutionwere only
examined superficially and a lack of (self-) criticism is identified8. Examples include statements such as, ‘[policy]
action to build a low-emission and climate-resilient society is expanding’ and ‘further and faster climate action
[is possible] provided that barriers are addressed and efforts to create an enabling environment increased’ [12].
Key barriers were said to include a lack of political will, shortcomings in existing policy frameworks, and a lack of
finance. Interestingly, a recurring claimwasmade that opportunities for improving existing policy interventions
depend on ‘demands for an adequate Paris Agreement work programme to be adopted at COP24’ [12]. Fourth,
the resulting report onGood Practices [13] emphasises developments in technology and the use of economic
incentives across key sectors such as energy and transport. Here, onewonders whether the lack of inputs from
Parties prevented the treatment or identification of a wider set of policy interventions.While there is increasing
evidence that, in theory, technologicalmeasures can help tomeet the 1.5 °C target [6], modelling studies
critically highlight the need for rapid changes in behaviour and lifestyles to limit climate change [14, 15]. Thus,
the strong focus on technologies seems incompatible with growing calls formore behavioural-oriented policy
interventions [14, 16, 17]. This is despite the fact that ‘psychological factors (e.g. short-termism and self-
interest)’ [12]were identified by the TalanoaDialogue as a critical barrier formore effective policy action.
In all, we argue that the TalanoaDialogue has failed to clearly characterize the nature and evolution of policy
portfolios that underlie NDCs. This wasmost likely due to its limited scope, combinedwith a lack of data and
systematic reporting regarding the national and non-statemeasures already in place. Consequently, the process
was dominated by ‘a collection of ideas, rather than a set of conclusions’ [10]. Altogether, these challengesmade
it difficult to establish amore comprehensive overview of past experience and use it to advance future
policymaking (i.e. ‘howdowe get there?’).
Here, we aim to address this gap. The purpose of our study is to quantify the nature and evolution of low-
carbon energy technology (LCET) policy interventions.We combine historical evidence of policy
implementation efforts with a directed content analysis. Our study aims to provide important insights for
policymakers.We limit our analysis to policies andmeasures that encourage the adoption and use of renewable
energy and energy-efficiency technologies. The agricultural and forestry sectors are excluded. Given the
mandate of the TalanoaDialogue, we address policy interventions at the national and city level. The latter is
critical because cities can lead theway in climate change action [18], and bottom-up initiatives are pivotal in
closing the emissions gap left byNDCs [19, 20].We focus on twomain areas: policy instruments (i.e. economic
incentives, regulations, information schemes and voluntary agreements); and behavioural factors (i.e. cognitive,
motivational and contextual aspects) that prevent or promote sustainable energy behaviour [17, 21, 22]. In turn,
we conceptualise behavioural-oriented interventions as any policy instrument (e.g. economic incentive) or
policymeasure (e.g. practices, processes) that either explicitly incorporates behavioural factors (i.e. cognitive,
motivational and contextual aspects) into its design, or is deliberately intended to address the constraints, biases
6
Paragraph 8 inArticle 4 of the Paris Agreement states that ‘In communicating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall
provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency andunderstanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant
decisions of theConference of the Parties serving as themeeting of the Parties to this Agreement’.
7
Reports are publicly available at https://talanoadialogue.com/
8
We acknowledge that the lack of criticismwas likely to have been driven by the nature of the process and framed by themeaning of the
‘Talanoa’ tradition, which encourages participants to avoid blaming others andmaking critical observations.
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and the context of human decisionmaking (e.g. via choice defaults to promote green electricity, social norm
information campaigns to promote energy conservation). Further details are given in the next section.
Our study extendsprevious assessments about thedevelopment of climate and energy policymixes [23, 24–26],
including studies ofmeasures and commitments by non-state actors [27, 28].9Notably, these efforts have focused
on specific aspects of climate policy (e.g. climate legislationor top-level policies) in a limitednumber of countries (e.g.
industrialisednations), over relatively short periods, and largely ignoredpolicies that explicitly target behavioural
factors. Strikingly, althoughclaimshavebeenmade that behavioural factors are overlookedbypolicymakers
[21, 29], such claims remainunsupported.Yetmultiple behavioural factors have been shown toplay akey role in
LCET-relatedhumandecisionmakingprocesses [21, 22, 30–32]. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that the
inclusionof behavioural factors is consistentwith (cost-) effectivepolicy interventions [14, 30, 33].Modelling studies
showa significant short-termmitigationpotential throughbehavioural change: 20% in theUnited States [34] andup
to 16% in theEuropeanUnion [35].Withdue limitations, our study aims to address these points.
2.Methodological approach
Weanalysed national (top-down) and city-level (bottom-up) policy interventions that promote or encourage
themarket uptake of LCET technologies. The dataset consisted of various databases (details below), whichwere
the subject of a directed content analysis. The latter involves examining documentary evidence [36] following
existing conceptual frameworks (e.g. frombehavioural economics or environmental psychology) and prior
research (e.g. policy evaluation) [37]. The approach involves counting and comparing keywords followed by the
interpretation of trends and patterns [37]. In our case, the analysis aimed to understand the nature and evolution
of policy portfolios that supportNDCs under the Paris Climate Agreement.10
First,five categories were defined: (1) geographical coverage, (2) policy instruments at the national level, (3)
policy instruments at the city level, (4) orientation of policy design andmitigation actions, and (5) policy status
(see table 1). For the top-down analysis, we divided theworld into eight geographical regions (Category 1), and
individual countries were categorised as a function of the geographical scope of each region.
Categories 2 and3 refer to top-down (national) andbottom-up (city)perspectives, respectively.Wedefinedpolicy
interventions as any courseof action, programmeoractivity takenormandatedbynational or local actors that seeks to
encourage sustainable energybehaviour through the adoptionanduseof LCET.Nodistinctionwasmadewith respect
to thepotential for emissions reductions.National-level policy instrumentsweredefinedusing the taxonomygiven in
the5th IPCCAssessmentReportWorkingGroup III [38],which lists the following: (i) economic incentives that alter
the conditions andbehaviourofmarket agents via pricemechanisms (e.g. taxes, subsidies, emissions trading); (ii)direct
regulatory approaches involvingmandates or rules that subject participantsmust fulfil (e.g. building codes,minimum
performance standards); (iii) information schemes that provide comprehensive andaccurate information to
consumers andproducers (e.g. education, public awareness campaigns and labellingprogrammes), and (iv)voluntary
actionsbetween theprivate sector and the government tomeet a givenobjectiveor target (e.g.GHGemission
reductionpledges, sectoral energy efficiency targets). Specificpolicy instrumentswere thusused as keywords.The list
of city-level policy actions (Category 3) followed the taxonomyprovidedby theCarbonDisclosureProject (CDP) [39].
TheCDPdatabasewas theprincipal sourceof information fordevelopingCategory3 and,overall, it offered thebest
classificationofpolicy instruments (andcommitments) froma longer-termperspective (2012 to2017).
Category4 addressedwhether behavioural factors are indeedbeingoverlookedbypolicymakers [21, 29].
Specifically,we examinedwhetherpolicies aim to addressmarket failureorbehavioural factors.Market failureswere
conceptualised asflaws in themarket (e.g. informationasymmetries, negative externalities) thatprevent an efficient
allocationofLCETs [38, 40]. Behavioural factorswere conceptualised in termsof behavioural anomalies (or
‘irrationalities’) andmotivational aspects. The former aredefinedasbehaviours that are inconsistentwith rational
choice theory and thus yield suboptimal outcomes [41, 42].Deviations fromrational choice arenotnecessarily erratic,
but can lead to systematic differences betweendecisionutility (i.e. expectedor intendedutility at the timeof choice) and
experiencedutility (i.e. utility experiencedafter the choice) [42].Motivational aspectsweredefinedas the reasons to
engage in sustainable energybehaviours (e.g. pleasure, altruism, social norms), including contextual factors that define
or affect the costs andbenefits of energybehaviours and therefore individualmotivations [43]. Together, these
behavioural factorshelp inunderstandingwhypolicy interventionsdonot always yield the expected effects [14, 38]. In
the context of climate changemitigation andenergyuse,wewere guidedby, for example, self-control problems,
referencedependentpreferences, heuristics, limited attention,procrastinationand statusquobias [21, 22, 29, 31, 44].
Policieswere codedas 0 (noexplicit inclusion) and1 (explicit inclusion).Weused the taxonomyof choicepolicy
architecture techniquesdevelopedbyMünscher et al [45] targeting judgment anddecisionmaking to identify explicit
9
Wedo not knowwhether or not existing studies about policy development and performancewere considered by the TalanoaDialogue.
10
All data sources are publicly available. Ourmaterial is available upon request.
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Table 1.Categories, items and coding in directed content analysis.
Category 1: Geographical coverage
Sub-category Searched items Code
Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo,Dem. Rep.Of Congo, Côte
d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya,Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, SouthAfrica, Sudan, UnitedRep. Of
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, other Africa
1
Asia Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia,HongKong (China), India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan,
DPR ofKorea,Malaysia,Mongolia,Myanmar,Nepal, Pakistan, People’s Rep. of
China, Philippines, Singapore, SouthKorea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Viet-
nam, other Asia
2
Latin America (Latam)& theCaribbean Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad andTobago, Uruguay, Venezuela,
other Americas
3
Middle East Bahrain, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,Oman,Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, SyrianArabRepublic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
4
Non-OECDEurope& the Former Soviet
Union (FSU)
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Georgia, Gibraltar, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
FYR ofMacedonia,Malta, Republic ofMoldova,Montenegro, Romania, Russian
Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, USSR (for-
mer), Yugoslavia (former)
5
Oceania Australia, NewZealand 6
OECDEurope Austria, Belgium, CzechRepublic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom
7
OECDNorthAmerica Canada,Mexico, United States 8
Category 2: Policy instruments at the national level
Sub-category Searched items Code
Economic incentives Subsidy, grant, loan, tax credit, rebate, carbon tax, carbon pricing, emission trading
scheme, procurement, tender programme, tradable green certificate, tradable
energy efficiency certificate, energy saving trading, subsidy removal, performance
contracting, R&D funds
1
Regulatory approaches Performance standard,minimum standard, emission standard,monitoring plan,
obligation, quota, building codes, building standards, compulsory auditing, guar-
antee of origin,mandatory target, regulation, binding legislation
2
Information schemes Certification, information centre, technical assistance, awareness raising, educa-
tional campaign, labelling scheme, feedback, rewards, public awareness
3
Voluntary actions Energy efficiency accord, optional target, chosen renewable target, emission reduc-
tion target, sectoral target, discretional energy saving programme, voluntary label-
ling scheme, voluntary agreement
4
Category 3: Policy actions at the city level
Sub-category Searched items Code
Technology& infrastructure investments Energy efficiency/ retrofitmeasures, improve fuel economy and reduceCO2 from
vehicles Infrastructure for non-motorized transport, recycling or composting col-
lections and/or facilities Low or zero carbon energy supply generation, improve
bus infrastructure, services, and operations, on-site renewable energy generation,
LED /CFL / other luminaire technologies, recyclables and organics separation
fromother waste, improve rail, metro, and tram infrastructure, services and
operations, water recycling and reclamation, switching to low-carbon fuels, land-
fill management, wastewater to energy initiatives, smart grid, carbon emissions
reduction from industry, optimize traditional power/ energy production,
improve the efficiency of waste collection, smart lighting, improve the efficiency of
freight systems, improve the operations of shipping ports, transmission and dis-
tribution loss reduction, improve the efficiency of long-haul transport
1
Information& awareness Waste prevention policies and programs, awareness and education for non-motor-
ized transport Transportation demandmanagement, building performance rating
and reporting, Encourage sustainable food production and consumption, smart
public transport, watermetering and billing
2
4
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behavioural-oriented interventions.There are three categories: (a)decision information (a choice architecture that
targets thepresentationofdecision-relevant information, for example, social referencepoints); (b)decision structure
(a choice architecture that targets the arrangementof options anddecision-making format, for example, choice
defaults); and (c)decisionassistance (a choice architecture that targets self-regulation so that decision-makers can
materialise their intentions, for example, commitment).
Finally, Category 5 addressed the status of policy interventions (both national and city-level). Specifically, it
looked at whether policies and/ ormeasures were still being enforced or had ended.
In terms of data, our analysis aimed to examine a representative cross-section of decarbonisation policy
interventions. A total of 15 databases (see table 2), containingmore than 10,000 policies andmeasures were
Table 1. (Continued.)
Category 1: Geographical coverage
Sub-category Searched items Code
City planning Green space and/or biodiversity preservation and expansion, transit oriented devel-
opment Eco-district development strategy, urban agriculture, compact cities,
brownfield redevelopment programs, low-carbon industrial zones
3
Regulation Building codes, building standards 4
Other Developing the green economy, instruments to fund low carbon projects, other 5
Category 4: Orientation of policy design andmitigation actions
Sub-category Searched items Code
Market failures Information asymmetry, non-competitivemarkets, externalities, public goods 0
Behavioural factors Self-control, reference dependent, heuristics, limited attention, procrastination, sta-
tus quo bias, irrational behaviour, contextualmotivation, behavioural anomalies,
bounded rationality, boundedwillpower, bounded self-interest, cognitive bias,
social norms, nudge, framing, loss/ risk aversion, behavioural economics, dis-
counting, satisficing, salience
1
Category 5: Policy status
Sub-category Searched items Code
Ended Ended, terminated, phased-out, cancelled, superseded 0
Enforced Implemented, enforced, in-force, on-going 1
Table 2.Reviewed databases.
For policy instruments at the national level Source
AsianDevelopment Bank (Country and Sector project database) http://adb.org/projects
AfricanDevelopment BankGroup (Project andOperations
database)
http://afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/
EconomicCommission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(Country profiles and statistics)
http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.
asp?idioma=i
International EnergyAgency (Climate Change, Renewable Energy,
Energy Efficiency database)
http://iea.org/policiesandmeasures/
International Center for ClimateGovernance (Climate Policy
Observer database)
http://climateobserver.org/country-profiles/
International Institute for SustainableDevelopment (Sustainable
Energy/Climate Change Policy and Practice)
http://sdg.iisd.org/
Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank (Political Institutions, State
Capabilities, and Public Policy: An International Dataset)
https://mydata.iadb.org/Reform-Modernization-of-the-State/
Political-Institutions-State-Capabilities-and-Publ/j6yb-w5eq
Global Climate Legislation database http://lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/research-theme/governance-
and-legislation/
NewClimate Institute (Climate PolicyDatabase) http://climatepolicydatabase.org/
World Bank (Project andOperations database) http://worldbank.org/projects?lang=en
WorldResource Institute (SD-PAMs database) http://projects.wri.org/sd-pams-database
For policy actions at the city level Source





Environ. Res. Commun. 1 (2019) 061001
reviewed. Although by nomeans exhaustive, the top-down analysis included 11 databases provided by awide
variety of organisations (see column 1). This informationwas supplemented by peer-reviewedmaterial and
country-specific official documentation. Data covered the period 2000–2015. The bottom-up (city-level) review
was based on several climate-energy networks and their respective databases ofmitigation actions (see table 2).
This included ‘good practices’ reported by signatories to the EuropeanCovenant ofMayors [46], climate actions
undertaken by theGlobal Covenant ofMayors for Climate and Energy [47], entries in the International Council
for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) carbonn® registry [48], UNFCCC’s collection of climate actions by
cities [49], and emission reduction activities reported to theCDP [39]. Climate actions are self-reported by cities
and interventions included in the different databases overlap; typically they are amixed collection of
commitments, strategies, action plans and actual policy instruments.While thefirst transnationalmunicipal
climate networkswere developed around twenty years ago, extensive data is only available for the pastfive to ten
years. The problemof overlaps and differences in categorising climate actionsmeant that entries fromdifferent
databases were notmerged. The city-level review covered the period 2012–2017 and datawas also supplemented
by peer-reviewedmaterial.
3. Results and discussion
The top-down analysis yielded three important results (figures 1(a)–(c)). First, there has been significant growth
in LCETpolicy implementationworldwide.We identified approximately 1,600 interventions enforced by the
end of 2015. The composition of portfolios varies across regions (e.g. betweenNon-OECDEurope andAfrica)
(figure 1(b)). A clear implementation of policy interventions is observed, however, progress slowed after 2009,
and it is unclear whether this was due to policy delays or a lack of public data.11 This significant increase,
particularly prior to 2009,may be explained by the negotiations that preceded theCopenhagenClimate Change
Conference of the Parties (COP15). It has been argued that COP15 brought climate and energy policy to the top
Figure 1. (a)Evolution of global LCETpolicy interventions over the period 2000–2015. Bars shownet annual additions (i.e.
frequencies). Cumulative (in-force) interventions are shown by the solid line; (b)Composition of implemented policy interventions
per region in 2015. The number of identified, enforced policies is shown in parenthesis. (c)Global breakdown of implemented (in-
force) economic incentives in 2015.
11
We therefore compared this trendwith data from theClimate PolicyDatabase (CPD), which is one of themost comprehensive databases
we used in our study. This exercise confirmed an upward trend that peaked in 2009 (see supplementary figure 5) and a (less-steep) downward
trend post-2009. The comparison also highlighted a discrepancy in the number of implemented policies for 2015.However, this is explained
by the fact that the CPD includes policies that address the entire fossil fuelmix and the agricultural and forestry sectors, which are outside the
scope of our study.
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Figure 1. (Continued.)
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of the political agenda [50, 51]. Over time, policymixes have grown steadily; particularly in less-industrialised
regions (e.g. Africa andMiddle East) (see supplementary figure 4, available online at stacks.iop.org/ERC/1/
061001/mmedia). In particular, there is stagnation inOECDNorthAmerica post-2009, and recoil of policy
implementation inOceania after 2012. Relatively speaking, Oceania is the only region to demonstrate amore
balanced policymix. Emphasis on regulatory approaches can be identifiedmostly acrossOECDEurope (34%)
and non-OECDEurope (38%) compared to LatinAmerica (20%), Oceania (21%) andOECDNorthAmerica
(16%).WhileOECDEurope (741 entries), Asia (312 entries) andNorthAmerica (193 entries) had the highest
absolute number of enforced policies by 2015, significant relative increases were found for Africa, theMiddle
East andNon-OECDEurope. Compared to industrialised regions, thismay be because countries in less-
industrialised regions have defined their LCETpolicy strategiesmore recently. It is clear that further research is
needed to identify the specific learning, persuasion, emulation and/ or harmonisationmechanisms that have
historically driven the design of policymixes across regions.
A second, striking, finding is the emphasis on economic incentives (figure 1(b)), which globally accounted
for 49%of implemented policies in 2000, increasing to 53% in 2015 (see supplementary figure 2). Figure 1(c)
shows that subsidies (such as tax credits, loan guarantees, direct grants, soft loans, feed-in tariffs, and accelerated
depreciation) dominate. It is clear that, historically, economic incentives have diffused acrossmost regions (see
supplementary figure 4). This is consistent with the increasing role of economic thinking that has already been
identified in environmental policy [52]. From this point of view, the 2009 peak noted abovemay also be
explained by the implementation of Keynesian economic stimulus packages that followed the 2008–2009
financial crisis. These packages promoted the transition to ‘green growth’, and LCETswere expected to play a
pivotal role [53–55]. Although the dominant use of economic incentives suggests that an economic crisis was
needed to boost themarket uptake of LCETs, various global studies suggest that they have not been effective.
This is thought to be due to a lack of stringency and structural interdependencies between economic and
emissions growth [8, 56–60]. Finally, although subsidies are very popular (figure 1(c)), there is limited empirical
research into their performance [61], notably synergies and overlaps with othermitigation policies [62, 63].
Quantitative studies are thus needed to evaluate the economic efficiency and (cost-) effectiveness of subsidies
compared to other policy instruments; including specific convergencemechanisms.
Third, we found that policy portfolios predominantly aim to correctmarket failures, whilemuch less attention
is given to behavioural factors. This is consistentwith the disciplines that dominate the analysis andunderstanding
of policymixes targeting energy transitions, such as environmental economics [64], and the approach taken by, for
example, theEuropeanCommission todecarbonise its energy system,which relies heavily onmarket failures and
technology neutrality [65]. Our reviewofpolicies highlights that policy interventions are limited to internalising
external costs, reducingfinancial constraints andmoderating the lack of information. Behavioural interventions
that focus on voluntary behavioural change (e.g. targeting perceptions and cognition) or contextual change (e.g.
targeting the framing of decisionmaking) [66] are limited and confined to information schemes only. For example,
the International EnergyAgency’s EnergyEfficiency Policies andMeasures database, one of themost
comprehensive archives, lists only onebehaviouralmeasure (‘Energy efficiency strategy’ in SouthAfrica). At the
same time, half of its nearly 2,000 entries are labelled as ‘economic instruments’, often referring explicitly to
correctingmarket failures. Basedon the taxonomydeveloped byMünscher et al [45]wenote that behavioural-
orientedpolicies primarily aimeither to provide information (e.g. via public information campaigns or feedback)
or simplify it (e.g. via labelling schemes). Despite claims of growing interest in applied behavioural science and
behavioural economics amongpolicymakers [33, 67, 68], our results suggest that policymakers have failed to take
explicit account of behavioural factors via, for example, theuse of social normative reference points [30]; green
energy defaults [69]; the promotion of energy community platforms to foster peer-effects [70]; goal setting [66];
and commitment [71].
The results of the bottom-up analysis were comparable to national-level findings. Figure 2(a) shows that the
number of city-level interventions has increased rapidly over the past decade. TheGlobal Covenant ofMayors
for Climate and Energy, which is the largest transnationalmunicipal climate network, has registered policy
commitments from7,500 cities, targeting a total population of 681million [72]. Similarly, implemented
emission reduction activities reported to theCDP grew rapidly between 2012 and 2017.While climate actions
reported in the carbonn® registry have increased—fromabout 400 at the endof 2010 to about 7,200 in2017
[48, 73]– it is unclearwhether this is due to increased reporting or additional activity. Figure 2(b) shows that
investments in infrastructure and technologicalmeasures dominate. For example, entries in theCDPdatabase
refer to energy-efficiencymeasures inbuildings (8%), investments innon-motorized transport infrastructure
(6%), waste infrastructure (5%), low-orno-carbon energy generation (5%), and on-site renewable energy
production (4%). Only a few actions explicitly target behavioural factors, notably transportation demand
management (3%). Technology and infrastructure investments dominate the carbonn® registry,making upmore
thanhalf of all entries [48].Here again, there is little evidence of considerationbeing given to behavioural factors.
Of the 3,800mitigation actions reported in the carbonn® registry, 3,500 emission reduction activities reported to
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theCDP in2017, and 6,100 examples of goodpractices recorded by the EUCovenant ofMayors, only a handful
explicitly address such factors. Examples include setting defaults for green electricity tariffs andoffering sustainable
transport subsidies to people experiencing salient life events (e.g. childbirthor a change of job).
The ambitious 1.5 °Ctarget implies that ‘citiesmust simultaneously practice ‘megamitigation’ [74].Given that
cities are growing andnewones arebeingbuilt at an astonishing rate, it is clear that priority shouldbe given to the
implementationof LCETs [75]. At the same time, people live,move aroundand consume in cities, and their
behaviour(s) are a key determinant in energyuse and associated carbonemissions [17]. In addition to infrastructural
and institutional lock-ins, various ‘behavioural’ lock-ins have been already identified (e.g. a lackof ability to judge
potentialfinancial gains fromLCET) [76]. Treating theurbanpopulation as a ‘market actor’whendesigning and
implementingmitigationpolicies runs the risk of setting thewrongpriorities, andpotentiallywasting the behavioural
leverage that is pivotal to encouraging bottom-updecarbonisationprocesses.
Overall, the limited evidencewe found of policy interventions that explicitly address behavioural factors was
confined to non-governmental actions. Typically, interventions are deployed via experiments, pilot studies or
small-scale utility-driven initiatives in (mostly) industrialised countries [21, 30, 33, 66, 68, 69, 71, 77, 78].
Apriori, this situation suggests a divide between governmental and non-governmental initiatives and indicates
that local behavioural interventionsmay need to be coupled or coordinatedwith national policy instruments.
However, althoughwe hardly found explicit cases where behavioural factors informnational policy design, we
acknowledge that some policiesmay have been informed by behavioural factors. Examples could include
performance standards that have the potential to reduce choice overloadswhen choosing energy-consuming
Figure 2. (a)Number of in-force city-level emission reduction actions by sector (Source: CDP). The categorisation of sectors was
changed after 2014; ‘community-scale development’was previously referred to as ‘urban land use’. The value for 2017 includes
reported actions up to September 2017. (b)Emission reduction activities by cities in 2017 (Source: CDP). ‘Other’ includesfinancial
instruments, green economymeasures and other unclassified activities.
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products (e.g. the TopRunner Programme in Japan), or labelling programmes that can help in overcoming
limited attention and heuristics (e.g. the Energy Label Programme in Europe; Fuel Economy Labels in the
United States). Better-quality reporting and further research are needed to determine the role of psychology,
behavioural economics and applied behavioural science in policy design. In addition, it is important to study the
mechanisms that support or deter the diffusion of behavioural-oriented policy interventions.
Thefindings seem to support claims that there is a lack of consideration of behavioural factors in
policymaking. For instance, our results suggest the persistence of a traditional, technocratic approach that
emphasises economic thinking andwhich does not necessarily deliver effective and efficient policies [52]. The
TalanoaDialogue recognised the ineffectiveness of policymixes already implemented, and concluded that
‘despite all our [policy] efforts, greenhouse gas emissions, their concentration in the atmosphere and global
average temperature, are still on the rise’ [10]. However, despite the growing knowledge about the factors that
enable or hinder climatemitigation actions [17, 79], the strong focus onmarket failures implies an ongoing
assumption that energy users have clear, stable preferences over time, use all available informationwhen
decidingwhether to adopt and use LCETs, and are unaffected by decision contexts [21, 41]. To some extent, our
findings are confirmed by the ‘good practice’ inputs submitted to the TalanoaDialogue at the COP24 [see 15]: an
emphasis on economic incentives and the technology development; and little or no application of behavioural
factors in the design or improvement of policies.12 It seems that policy efforts are limited to approaches that
reduce the use and implementation of LCETs to the application of economic theory [cf 80]. Consequently, one
could argue that current policy is not very effective because, among several factors, it fails to explicitly take
account ofmounting evidence of suboptimal decision-making and normative, emotional,moral and social
influences affecting energy choices and climate action [21, 30, 32, 43, 66, 78, 81–83].With respect to our review
of the documentation, the limited consideration of behavioural factors, and the lack of behavioural-oriented
interventionsmay be driven by a lack of transdisciplinary approaches designed to support policymaking
[64, 79, 84], political and ethical concerns regarding the integration of libertarian paternalistic approaches [85],
and a poor understanding of what behavioural science has to offer [86–88]. A key challenge for policymakers
appears to be how to (better) identify the behavioural factors that affect decision processes and choices, and
understand how they can be targeted by specific policy interventions [22, 33].
4. Conclusion
The lack of progress in reducing carbon emissions, and the innumerable challenges resulting from the Paris
Agreement are clear evidence that the full potential of LCETs cannot be unlocked unless policymakers urgently
reconsider not only their interventions and ambitions per se, but also the approaches that underlie and generate
these interventions. Outputs from the TalanoaDialogue imply an urgent need to reconcile the long-term vision
of the Paris Agreement with stringent, short-termnational and local-level policymixes.With due limitations,
our study highlights a significant spread of policy interventions and growing emphasis on economic incentives,
technology and infrastructure. If economic incentives were once considered an innovative approach to
environmental policy, the political economy of the Paris Agreement is testing the theoreticalmerits of this
approach, and challenging the optimism of advocates. Combinedwith a lack of stringency, experience shows no
effectiveness and also a failure to bridge the policy–science gap, particularly with respect to behavioural sciences.
Although there appears to be a rise in the inclusion of behavioural insights in policymaking [33], our study
questions its extent –at least in terms of the problematisation of climate actions and energy choices on the
demand side [79, 84].We acknowledge thatmuchmore research on policy convergencemechanisms and better-
quality reporting (e.g. on policy design and costs) are needed to further scrutinise policy efforts.13 In addition,
the incorporation of behavioural insights into policymaking is no panacea [33, 71, 89]. Nevertheless, emerging
evidence suggests that policies are likely to bemore (cost-) effective when they systematically take behavioural
factors into account [14, 30, 32, 33, 68, 71, 88, 90, 91].We need to seize this opportunity to complement or
improve the existing policymixes. At theCOP24, the TalanoaDialogue called ‘upon everyone to act with
urgency’ and ‘provide grounds for bold, integrated and coherent policies’ [92].We, in turn, call upon the
TalanoaDialogue (and similar initiatives) to urgently consider and promote amuchmore rigorous, realistic,
transparent and integrated approach to design, implement and evaluate LCETpolicy portfolios.
12
See supplementarymaterial for amenu of good practices regarding specific LCETpolicy interventions. Compared to the outputs from the
TalanoaDialogue, this aims to provide awider set of options. It highlights the need for policies that are simple andmanageable; however,
further research is needed to ascertain the effects of policies as amix. The results of any assessment are likely to be context-specific.
13
At the EU level, the new ‘Regulation on theGovernance of the EnergyUnion’ aims to encourage reliable and transparent reporting of
energy and climate policies.
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